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In the literature on the turn to the left in the wider Latin American region, Central
America has generally been neglected. The aim of this article is to seek to fill that
gap, while specifically assessing the left turn’s impact on prospects for
democratization in the sub-region. Using three case studies – El Salvador,
Honduras and Nicaragua – the article questions the usefulness of transition
theory for analysis and instead offers a framework based on state/civil society
interaction within the context of globalization. Four key conclusions are
made: First, democratization is not a linear process, but can be subject to
simultaneous processes of democratization and de-democratization. Second,
continued deep structural inequalities remain central to the region’s politics
but these often provoke unproductive personalistic and partisan politics which
can inhibit or curtail democratization. Third, interference from local and/or
international economic actors can curtail or reverse democratization measures,
underlining the influence of globalization. Fourth, Central America is
particularly revelatory of these tendencies due to its acute exposure to
extreme oligarchic power and outside influence. It hence can help shed light
on wider questions on the blurring of boundaries between state, civil society
and market and its impact on democratization, especially within the context of
globalization. In this way the article contributes to the analysis of Central
America in the current context of the ‘pink tide’, underlines the importance of
continued analysis of Central America for democratization studies, and brings
new insight to debates on transition theory.
Keywords: Central America; El Salvador; Honduras; Nicaragua; pink tide;
left; democratization; transition theory
Introduction
In recent years the emergence of left and left-of-centre governments in Latin
America – the so-called ‘pink tide’ – has been attracting much academic atten-
tion.1 It is surprising, however, that little of this literature places the phenomenon
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within the context of democratization theory, particularly transition theory, or
‘transitology’, which held great sway over much political science analysis of
Latin America in preceding years.2 Furthermore, most of the literature on the
‘pink tide’ has understandably concentrated on South America, where the most
notable left governments have emerged. Little attention has been paid to Central
America, despite the fact that that this region was the centre of intense activity
by the revolutionary left in the 1980s, and an intense right-wing counter-offensive
in the context of the Cold War, resulting in devastating civil conflicts.3 Further-
more, it was subject to one of the first comprehensive international peace-building
processes in the post Cold War era, including internationally supported democra-
tization programmes.4 Yet, with the elections of Daniel Ortega of the revolutionary
Sandinista movement (FSLN) in Nicaragua (2007), Mauricio Funes of the erst-
while left guerrilla movement, FMLN (Faribundo Martı´ Front for National
Liberation) in El Salvador (2009), and the social democratic A´lvaro Colom in
Guatemala (2008), Central America clearly has not been immune to the ‘pink
tide’ sweeping the wider region. The 2009 coup against left-leaning Manuel
Zelaya in Honduras further signals the region’s importance for understanding
the backlash to broader pink-tide politics in the context of democratization, and
as we argue here, de-democratization processes.
The main aim of the article is then to examine the ‘pink tide’ in the Central
American region, and in particular its impact on the prospects for increased
democratization there. To do this the article takes as its cases three countries
which have elected left or left-leaning governments in recent years – El Salva-
dor, Honduras and Nicaragua.5 It begins by offering a critical review of tran-
sition theory in order to foreground the importance of a relational analysis of
civil society and the state for understanding processes of both democratization
and de-democratization. This analysis concludes that it is necessary not only
to take account of who controls the state, but also to analyse who constitutes
civil society and what impact the existing correlation of forces within civil
society has had on the state and its actions. Moreover, we argue that these find-
ings must be put within the context of globalization in order to accurately assess
the impact on democratization or de-democratization processes in the polity
under study.
This analytical framework is then used to argue that democratization is not a
linear process, but may be subject to processes of de-democratization. Historic con-
tinuities within Central America, namely the continued presence of deep structural
inequalities remain central to the region’s politics. We argue, however, that these
struggles are frequently sidetracked into unproductive personalistic and partisan
politics which can inhibit or curtail democratization. These findings open up
wider questions about the blurring of boundaries between state, civil society and
market and its impact on democratization, especially within the current context
of globalized neoliberal socio-economic structures. In this way the article not
only seeks to emphasize the importance of continued analysis of Central
America for democratization studies, but also to make an important contribution
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to debate on democratization theory and in particular the continued relevance of
transition theory for political analysis globally.
Democratization theory and the role of civil society
Grugel identifies three types of democratization theories: modernization, historical
sociology and transition theory or ‘transitology’.6 As the latter theory was devel-
oped based primarily on democratization experiences in Southern Europe and
Latin America, it is hence the most relevant for this article.7 ‘Transitology’ sees
democratization as a process, led by cost-benefit calculations on the part of key
actors8 and has been subject to two major critiques. First, the very concepts of
‘transition’ and ‘democratization’ have been held to be inherently teleological in
their assumptions,9 with a pronounced institutionalist and electoralist bias in
what was deemed to be the ultimate democratic end-point.10 Second, ‘transitolo-
gists’ have been said to be concentrating too much on elite bargaining and pro-
cedural and institutional definitions of democracy, leading to difficulties in
explaining the varying outcomes of democratization processes, resulting in con-
ceptual stretching by analysts.11
In answer to the first critique on teleology, in return three points have been
raised. First, democratization needs to be viewed within a wide-angle, long-term
analytical perspective, perhaps from when it was first conceived in Ancient
Greece, but certainly since the Enlightenment.12 Second, democratization is
not a uni-directional process, but rather polities can experience periods of demo-
cratization and de-democratization, that is the ‘expansion and contraction of
popular rule’.13 Third, all real or concrete political systems – be they established
‘democracies’ in the ‘West’ or ‘authoritarian’ regimes elsewhere – ‘exhibit to
greater or lesser degrees democratic and autocratic traits’.14 This also under-
mines the notion that the ‘West’ – and ‘Western’ democratic structures – can
act as a yardstick against which other regimes are measured. Hence, the end
result of democratization processes should not be ‘democracy’ as established
in the ‘West’, which is equally subject to such processes. To echo Barrett,
Chavez, and Rodrı´guez-Garavito, ‘it may be more appropriate to speak of demo-
cratization as an ongoing, dynamic process than of democracy as a final end
state’.15
In answer to the second major critique, which argues that the concentration on
elite actions has led to problems in explaining outcomes, Grugel recommends
focusing on the interaction between state and civil society within the context of glo-
balization.16 First, she argues that, for democratization to occur, the state has to
undergo ‘a substantive transformation in its operations and its representativeness’,
to give it the capacity to deliver ‘better, more secure lives’ for citizens.17 Second, a
shift in the power balance in civil society must take place to facilitate this trans-
formation of the state. Finally, attention must be paid to globalization’s impact
on these processes in each state.18 All these three factors will have an impact on
the depth and quality of different democratization processes. She hence deals
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with the problem of structure, on the national and global levels, in explaining
outcomes.
This focus on state/civil society interaction, in the context of globalization
however needs a number of further conceptual clarifications. First, the concept
of the state managed here is shared with that put forward by Kirby, drawn from
Sørensen and Soederberg and has two elements.19 The first is that the state is a cen-
tralized system of rule, with a set of coercive and legal institutions, and a monopoly
on force, all operating within a defined territory. Yet each state can be characterized
by specific forms of capital accumulation, which in turn can give rise to distinct,
corresponding forms of political regime. In other words the actual institutional
features identified in the first element, are dependent on the specific regime of
capital accumulation which the state services.
Second, again following Kirby, globalization denotes ‘intensifying processes of
transnational interconnectedness’ in the economic, social, political, cultural and
communicational spheres, which is having a transformational impact on the state,
in both positive and negative ways.20 However, as Schirato and Webb argue, globa-
lization processes have been hegemonized by the ideas and institutions linked to neo-
liberalism.21 Neoliberalism as understood here is a set of policy prescriptions – as
famously summarized by Williamson’s ‘Washington Consensus’22 – grouped
around trade liberalization, easier foreign direct investment (FDI), and the reduction
of direct government state intervention in the economy in favour of the private sector
and the markets.23 It is also, however, as Panizza argues ‘an ideational frame . . . a
mental structure that shapes the way its holders see the world’, which is eminently
adaptable to changing conditions.24 Finally, it is hegemonic due, as Peck shows,
to it being deeply embedded in intellectual and policy networks both at the national
and international levels.25
Third, Grugel’s framework points to common agreement found in much of the
literature on the centrality of civil society in democratization processes,26 yet civil
society itself is a contested concept. We argue here that the particularities of this
empirical contestation over who or what is civil society can offer important insights
into democratization processes. Analyses of civil society can be grouped into four
perspectives. First, liberal perspectives see civil society as separate from state and
market, having a watchdog role towards the former and an unproblematized
relationship with the latter.27 Second, an ‘alternative’ neo-Gramscian perspective,
emerging from solidarity-oriented sectors of civil society, sees it as a realm of
struggle riven by inequalities, aimed at transforming the state to benefit the less pri-
vileged.28 Third, some argue that both these neglect what has been called an
‘uncivil society’ of criminal or clandestine groups such as gangs, terrorist organiz-
ations, or racist or xenophobic groups, amongst others.29 This is particularly res-
onant in contemporary Central America, where levels of criminality and
violence among non-state actors are among the highest in the world. Fourth, and
finally, some put forward a perspective denying the validity of civil society as an
explanatory concept,30 or from a more Marxist perspective question its separation
from the state31 or from the state and the market.32 Indeed, Meiksins Wood
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questions the liberal dichotomy of the state as an agent of oppression, and civil
society that of liberation. For her civil society – which includes the market – is
the ‘privatization of public power’33 and hence both it and the state are subsumed
in the over-arching and limiting structures of globalization and its interactions with
the politics of regional and national capital.
Pearce helps locate the roots of some of these perspectives in Latin America in
an exploration of the trajectory of democratization since independence. She ident-
ifies a bifurcated republican identity in Latin America, between classic liberal
republicanism inspired by a belief in individual liberty and a Rousseaunian
radical republicanism based on belief in the ‘common good’.34 Struggles
between these two types of republicanism shaped the contours of both state and
civil society in the region throughout post-colonial Latin American history.
From elite-based civil society organizations of the nineteenth century to the top-
down inclusion of popular sectors during the populist era; the authoritarian
counter-revolution of the 1970s, with its attempted eradication of progressive
civil society groups; the renaissance of social movements emerging in reaction
to this repression; and, the rebirth of ‘civil society’ as a concept in the democratic
transitions of the 1980s; in each of these eras it can be argued that distinct groups
were favoured over others by national states – and by foreign states through devel-
opment cooperation or other aid – as the ‘actually existing civil society’.
Pearce’s account indicates a number of important points useful in the construc-
tion of an interpretative framework for examining civil society/state interaction in
the Latin American context within processes of democratization. First, it reaffirms
the centrality of civil society to democratization processes and points to the long-
term nature of those processes. Second, it reveals the influence of ideology on con-
ceptions of civil society, with both forms of republicanism present in Latin
America shaping differing conceptions of it and thus its relations with the state
and market. Third, it points to the role of the state in privileging certain groups
over others – creating an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ dynamic – as the operative,
empirical ‘civil society’ of that era. Hence, the political context – internationally
as well as domestically – can denominate which social sectors are recognized offi-
cially as constituting civil society – and which are not. In other words who consti-
tutes civil society vis-a´-vis the state is not a given but a result of deliberate policy.
Pearce’s account thus indicates how the conception and constitution of civil
society in any given polity is shaped by the ideology, power configuration, class
sectors and political context dominant in that polity. ‘Civil society’ therefore is
not a fixed entity, with established permanent features, but rather an ‘empty signif-
ier’ over which struggles take place amongst the contending social forces for its
appropriation and definition. Actually existing ‘civil society’, we contend here,
is formed dialectically by the struggles between these different social, political
and institutional forces. As Robert Cox asserts: ‘Any fixed definition of the
content of the concept ‘civil society’ would just freeze a particular moment in
history and privilege the relations of social forces then prevailing’.35 The con-
ception and constitution of ‘civil society’ is therefore historically constructed
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and attention must be paid to the historical context in any assessment of its consti-
tution, a theme we draw out here.
To sum up, democratization must not be seen as a unilinear process but rather as
a constant, even daily, struggle between democratizing and de-democratizing ten-
dencies. Imperative to this is the need to place democratization processes within the
wider socioeconomic and structural contexts of neoliberal globalization, paying
specific attention to the interaction between the state, civil society and the
market. Civil society, thus, cannot be seen as a fixed entity, but one which is
shaped by struggles between contending social forces at specific historical
conjunctures.
This discussion allows us to identify five key questions to guide analysis of
democratization in the three case studies of El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua
in the context of the ‘pink tide’. First, who controls the state? Second, who consti-
tutes civil society in this context? Third, has there been a shift in the power balance
within civil society and what impact has this had on the state? Fourth, what influ-
ence has globalization had on these processes? Fifth and finally, have these pro-
cesses resulted in increased democratization or de-democratization? Before
going on to analyse the case studies, however, in the next section we will use
this framework to review and critique the so-called ‘pink tide’ phenomenon in
Latin America in order to help place them within this wider context.
Democratization, civil society/state relations and the emergence of the
‘pink tide’ in Latin America
The emergence of the ‘pink tide’ has been located in the failures of neoliberalism to
deliver its promise of prosperity, with a concurrent ‘democratic disillusion’
towards the political system which promoted it.36 This rejection of neoliberalism
was led by social movements which formed and found their voice during the neo-
liberal era, enriching and revitalizing the left and sidelining the old social demo-
cratic parties, who were often responsible for the introduction and
implementation of neoliberal policy. Among the unifying characteristics of the
new left governments which emerged from this dynamic, is a more pronounced
search for equality to counteract the perceived increase in inequality and poverty
left by neoliberalism in the region.37 This has been pursued in two principal
ways: through democratic innovation and a policy agenda that seeks to lessen
social inequality.
In the current context of ‘pink tide’ Latin America, social movements (for
example, women’s groups, environmentalists, anti-globalization activists, or indi-
genous groups) have emerged as the chief counterbalance to the ‘social forces of
oppression’ and are therefore identified as ‘the primary impetus for social and pol-
itical change’.38 This potential for change is argued to be best realized through the
adoption of participatory democracy, which is seen as a ‘convergence between the
deepening of democracy and . . . the revitalization of civil society and its articula-
tion with the state’.39 As the key attribute of the state is seen as its capacity to
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intervene in social and economic relations, it is thus viewed as a ‘strategic terrain’
upon which contending social and political forces struggle in order to realize their
strategies.40 Social movements thus can transcend the narrow role assigned to civil
society in liberal theory,41 aiming to transform the state both by redirecting its
modes of intervention (in order to lessen social and economic inequalities and
thus alter the balance of social forces) and transforming its forms of representation
(in order to make it more accessible and thus more susceptible to pressure from
below). Hence, the relationship between civil society (conceived of as social move-
ments) and the state ‘should be understood as a dialectical one’.42
Nonetheless, as many of the new left governments matured in power, this
promise of a renewed contract between civil society and the state did not always
materialize.43 Boron offers three reasons for this. First and notable for our cases,
the increased power of markets and their ‘capacity for blackmail’44 (capital flight,
or investment strikes, for instance) against governments which may introduce pol-
icies seen as detrimental to market interests. Second, ‘the persistence of imperial-
ism’,45 either through aid conditionalities imposed in return for debt readjustment
by the multilateral financial agencies and/or direct political demands from the
United States such as the ‘war on drugs’ and bilateral aid systems. Both are
policed through ‘the ideological manipulation made possible by big capital’s
almost exclusive control of the mass media, the creators of the “common sense”
of our times’.46 Third, the devaluation of democracy in the preceding decades
weakened the state’s ‘capacities for intervention in social life’,47 further exacerbated
by the many historical weaknesses of the state in Latin America.48 Additionally,
many Latin American left governments have pursued a development model
which privileges resource extraction, bringing it into conflict with many social
movements, such as environmentalist and indigenous groups in particular, despite
revenue from these being used, in some cases, to satisfy social demands.49All
these factors seriously circumscribe the room for manoeuvre of the new left
governments to deliver on their promises, causing disillusion and estrangement
amongst many of the social movements which had brought them to power and
impairing the prospects for the ‘new deal’ between state and civil society to
consolidate itself.
To summarize, returning to our framework above, we find in the new left gov-
ernments of Latin America, to greater or lesser degrees, on a local and/or national
level, an attempt to reorient state/civil society relations by facilitating greater civil
society influence over policy-making processes. Many of these governments, rhet-
orically or more practically, privilege certain social movements as the ‘actually
existing’ civil society. This interaction between social movements and government
has resulted in a greater emphasis being placed on social policy directed at lessen-
ing poverty and inequality. This re-orientation of policy, however, is severely cir-
cumscribed by the influence of neoliberalism, at the international and national
level, impairing its effectiveness and sowing distrust amongst the very social
movements who were instrumental in creating the conditions for the left to gain
power in the region. In other words the desired state/civil society alliance to
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advance equality and control the market is not emerging, primarily as a result of
national and regional capital interests strengthened by globalization processes.
While in this section we looked at the situation on state/civil society relations
within Latin America in general, how has Central America been faring in the
current context? The next section will examine these relations in Central
America in historical context, concentrating specifically on the article’s three
case studies: El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras. This will be followed by an
examination of empirical evidence gathered through fieldwork activity carried
out in the three Central American countries in 2009–2010. This field research con-
sisted of three research trips, two to all three countries, first in July/August 2009,
and again in January 2010, with a follow-up trip to Honduras in July 2010.
Research methodology consisted of interviews with non-governmental organiz-
ation (NGO) directors and staff, academics, government and business representa-
tives in each of the three countries, as well as focus groups with NGO members,
and researcher participation in panels and forums of discussion.50 Finally, in the
conclusion, we will summarize the main findings and evaluate their implications
for democratization theory and practice.
Democratization processes in El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua
in historical perspective
Following independence, liberal reform in Central America sought to break up tra-
ditional socioeconomic structures inherited from the colonial era and transform the
state in order to facilitate an export-oriented economy based on agricultural com-
modities.51 In El Salvador this resulted in the development of a unified national
bourgeoisie with strong institutions that were subservient to its needs. In Nicaragua
and Honduras, local elites remained divided and the state weak, with episodes of
US intervention in both. As a result, each of the countries developed different pol-
itical regimes with different patterns of state/society relations. El Salvador devel-
oped sharply polarized military-authoritarian regimes which often used managed
elections and ample coercion to control and suppress dissent with the full
cooperation of economic elites. In Nicaragua and Honduras, traditional dictator-
ships developed, based on patronage and clientelism, with a limited use of coercion
and ample corruption. In Nicaragua the state was dominated by the US backed
Somoza clan, while in Honduras it was led by military personnel, again supported
by the US, but with individual rather than institutional rule. In each state, civil
society was limited to bourgeois elites, with occasional reform gestures made to
trade unions and peasant groups.52
This situation changed substantially in the 1970s and 1980s. In Nicaragua in
1979, the popular, socialist Sandinista government swept away the Somoza clan
in power since 1932. This led to a long period of war against the US-supported
and funded contras, which finally resulted in the Sandinistas losing power in the
1990 elections to a US-supported conservative coalition. In El Salvador the exist-
ing military-bureaucratic regime was replaced in 1979 with a non-democratic,
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civilian regime with heavy support, both military and otherwise, from the United
States, in order to pursue the war against the revolutionary forces of the FMLN.
Finally, in Honduras the dictatorial regime in power from 1932 was replaced in
a managed transition to civilian, party rule in 1982. Honduras, however, was
also used as a base for US counter-revolutionary campaigns in El Salvador and
Nicaragua, thus, the military remained a powerful institution in Honduran politics
until the 1990s.
The path to peace was finally sealed in 1987 with the Esquipulas II agree-
ment.53 The wars had devastating impacts on Central America with 300,000
killed, two million refugees and an already weak social and economic infrastruc-
ture destroyed. In response, the international community launched a large and
complex peace-building strategy in Central America, with democratization pro-
cesses at its centre.54 Despite massive international investment, what resulted,
however, were ‘low intensity democracies’, which go little beyond electoralism.55
In all three countries elite domination continues of much of the economic and pol-
itical infrastructure. The public in general suffers from a ‘democratic disillusion’,
due to such factionalism and the inability of the state to solve problems of inequal-
ity, poverty and injustice.56 Although El Salvador and Nicaragua have strong civil
society organizations, emerging from the disbanded revolutionary movements,
these were frozen out of policy-making by the right-wing governments in both
states and in the case of Nicaragua, many continue to be excluded by the current
government of Daniel Ortega.
Arising partially from this situation, high levels of crime and violence have
been further compromising state capacity in each of the three countries. Jenny
Pearce57 has argued that this context of criminality is closely linked to the devel-
opment of the state in the region, notably its subservient relationship to elite inter-
ests. She suggests that we should be aware of the ways in which states enable
violence, whether this is through direct involvement in criminal networks, incapa-
city, complicity, omission and economic policies that further exacerbate inequal-
ities. Her argument is based on the contention that a historic ‘perverse state
formation’ took place in Latin America, dedicated to the preservation of elite
rule, and through which ‘categories of people are “sacrificed”’ to become non-
citizens, notably those who are victims of violence from both state and non-state
actors. This arrangement of power has not changed significantly with democratiza-
tion.58 Despite rising citizen preoccupation with security in the region, state
response has been weak. Notably, increased criminality provides economic oppor-
tunities, both legal and illegal. Key political actors in the region have economic
interests in this fast growing market for the provision of private security and the
provision of arms, but also some of the more illicit acts such as money laundering
and drugs.59
This is amply illustrated in the case of Central America. The northern triangle
of the isthmus has amongst the highest homicide rates in the world. In 2008 El
Salvador (52 people murdered out of 100,000) and Honduras (58/100,000) far sur-
passed the Latin American average (25/100,000 in 2006), while Nicaragua,
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however, remained well below it (13/100,000 in 2008).60 Many of these murders,
as with much crime in the region, are drug-related, due to Central America becom-
ing a crucial transport route for drugs from the Andean producing countries to the
North American and European consumer countries. Large, criminal and competing
transnational gangs have developed to manage this lucrative trade, with the finan-
cial sector at a national and regional level becoming involved to facilitate money
laundering, and with local youth gangs becoming involved at a micro-level in
terms of distribution and other tasks.
This huge growth in criminality in the region has had a debilitating effect on
Central American states on a number of levels. As crime has increased so has
citizen insecurity, yet the police and justice system are incapable of responding
effectively to the challenge, and indeed heavy-handed policies employed through-
out the region to target youth gangs havemerely exacerbated the problem by allow-
ing other types of crime to flourish.61 Corruption has becomewidespread, both on a
petty, daily basis but also at the highest level of state, with state/criminal relations
becoming increasingly institutionalized allowing ‘money laundering, control of
local state apparatus, buying of police and judicial authorities and political
parties or candidates in need of funding’.62 This can reach such levels that not
only does criminality subvert the state, it can even replace it, developing, in
some areas, into ‘parallel states with their own economic, social, and political regu-
latory systems’.63 Hence the very weakness of the state, exacerbated by globali-
zation, has allowed such criminal activity to grow, while simultaneously being
weakened further by it.
In sum, building on our framework above, the state in each of the three
countries has not experienced a transformation near enough sufficient to deliver
‘better, more secure lives’ to its citizens.64 Nor has a transformation taken place
in the power balance in civil society with elites remaining in control of key state
institutions and the state favouring an elitist, as against a popularly based, ‘civil
society’. Meanwhile, globalization, in the form of neoliberal restructuring has
further favoured those elites. They have benefitted from the privatization of
public assets and free trade agreements, while poverty and inequality remain
static or have deepened, adversely affecting lower and some middle sectors.65
The pervasiveness of criminality has subverted the state at a national level and
even replaced it in some local areas. Democratization therefore at the very least
has advanced little beyond electoral formalism and has brought few substantive
benefits to the ‘have less’, thus retarding that possibility even further. What, if any-
thing, has changed with the arrival of left or left-of-centre governments to power in
each of these three countries?
El Salvador’s turn to the left: challenges to re-democratization?
Democratization in El Salvador coincided with an aggressive neoliberalism devel-
oped by the right-wing party, ARENA, that held power from 1989–2009.
Throughout ARENA’s 20-year tenure, state institutions were widely perceived to
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serve the interests of a minority and closely linked to party objectives.66 Likewise,
civil society was restricted to a few organizations whose ideology was acceptable
to the interests of capital, such as Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social
Development (FUSADES) and the National Association of Private Enterprise
(ANEP). Other civil society organizations with arguably more progressive
agendas, many of which had grown out of the FMLN guerrilla movement, were
firmly excluded and formed an unofficial opposition often in conjunction,
though not always in agreement, with the FMLN. This not only led to charges
of a weak state, political exclusion and polarization, but also of electoral authori-
tarianism since the state was widely perceived to protect minority interests rather
than provide public services.67
The swearing-in of Mauricio Funes leading an FMLN government on 1 June
2009 challenged this hegemony and provided a real ‘test’ to both the procedures
and substance of democracy in El Salvador.68 In his inauguration speech, Funes
promised a government of national unity and has made a pragmatic effort to
reach across historic party lines.69 Through field research interviews and obser-
vations we found that advances had been made to include historically excluded
civil society sectors in policy-making but that gains are qualified. A Social and
Economic Council was set up to guide state policy, led by a chief government
advisor, Alex Segovia Cacere´s, with broad NGO and private sector participation.
The Funes government has included important elite families as backers and/or
state appointees, a move that has heralded criticism from the ranks of the
FMLN.70 The aim of this strategy was to include more ‘progressive’ elements of
the traditional Salvadoran oligarchy in a pluralistic, modernizing government
thus increasing its room for policy manoeuvre while not entirely alienating local
elites and their international allies.71 Hence, civil society, which previously was
associated with NGOs related to ARENA and business interests, has now
become more pluralistic with representation from those NGOs traditionally associ-
ated with the FMLN and ‘progressive’ elements of the traditional oligarchy.
This has led to a cautious shift in the power balance within civil society.
Although civil society groups previously shut out from policy-making now feel
some opening, new structures such as the Social and Economic Council have
had little direct policy impact.72 These strategies have also opened up breaches
within the FMLN movement, with the Funes government seen as hesitant, and
the links to bourgeois elites viewed with suspicion. Polarization also reinforces
previous patterns endemic in state structures, namely the state appointments dic-
tated by party loyalty, something which is equally prevalent in civil society.
This partisan polarization of the Salvadoran state points to the historic blurring
of boundaries between civil society, political parties and state institutions. More-
over, it points to the highly exclusionary nature of these bodies. Several leaders
from NGOs and academics historically associated with the FMLN took up posts
in the new government, although the massive sacking of personnel that usually
follows a change in government did not occur. Many state institutions remain
dominated by functionaries appointed by the previous ARENA administration,
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due to a belated introduction of a labour stability law for government functionaries
one month before Funes was sworn in, an act that was widely seen as an attempt for
ARENA to ensure its continued control of the state apparatus.73 On taking up
office, the Funes government found that several state institutions had spent large
parts of their budgets before the change of government, a prevalence of ‘ghost’ pro-
jects that did not exist yet cost the national purse millions of dollars and ‘ghost’
staff who failed to show up to work, but received payment.74 This is indicative
of high levels of corruption and, more pertinent to our analysis, of political man-
oeuvring that puts minority interests before effective governance. Squabbles
within government departments between old functionaries and new appointees
hinder reform.
The effects on the former incumbents have been both of retrenchment and
internal division. Taking advantage of increased levels of criminal violence, his-
toric right-wing groups such as ARENA, ANEP and the Chamber of Commerce
charge Funes government of ‘ungovernability’ and ‘lawlessness’.75 Thinly
veiled warnings from key ARENA figures such as former President Alfredo
Cristiani indicate they would do whatever it took to protect their ‘system of free-
doms’.76 This highlights threats to Funes’ limited space in which to manoeuvre
and also points to the determination of the right to protect their ‘system of
freedoms’ over democratic values (a theme that is discussed in more detail in
the Honduras case). Nonetheless, the position of the right has weakened following
the electoral defeat. In late 2009, a new party, GANA, was formed, weakening
ARENA’s position in the Legislative Assembly.77
Continuity is also evident at the international level. With its dollarized
economy, its membership of the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA) with the US, and its huge population of migrants, El Salvador is
highly globalized. This limits reform possibilities, for fear of response from the
US and local transnationalized elites. The impact of this can be seen also at a
regional level in its relationship with other ‘pink tide’ governments. Funes has dis-
tanced himself from Venezuela, despite many local FMLN administrations having
links to the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas’ trade and soli-
darity association ALBA. He has also expressed support for the Porfirio Lobo
administration in Honduras even though many Latin American countries, includ-
ing Brazil have refused to recognize its legitimacy.
These factors provide positive and negative indications for democratization in
El Salvador. On the positive side, increased inclusion of previously excluded civil
society groups in policy-making structures has opened up possibilities for pro-
gressive, inclusive measures to further democratization processes. On the negative
side, the continued patterns of polarization along party lines of many civil society
and state institutions (at national and local levels), and the predominant influence of
market-oriented ideology and US influence, seriously inhibit possibilities of demo-
cratizing policies. In this context, the fluidity between civil society, parties and the
state reinforce the view that these cannot be analysed as neatly autonomous, due to
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deep political influences and allegiances and the legacy of a state that has been built
on the interests of a narrow minority.
Democracy in crisis: the coup against President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras
Honduras is perhaps the most dramatic example of de-democratization in Latin
America and the site of a violent backlash against ‘pink tide’ politics. In June
2009, President Manuel Zelaya Rosales was ousted from office in a coup
enacted by economic and political elites. To most observers, including the
members of the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union
(EU) and huge numbers of Honduran citizens, this was a straightforward coup.78
As the news filtered out, thousands gathered to register their shock and dismay
at the presidential palace in Tegucigalpa. A de facto government was established
by Roberto Micheletti, president of Congress. During that period, the official
message was clear: a coup had not occurred, rather Zelaya’s expulsion was under-
stood as a case of constitutional secession of powers with Micheletti as ‘interim’
president. Popular protests were brutally repressed and the de facto regime
defied the international community to remain in power until January 2010. Sched-
uled elections were held in November 2009 which, while severely questioned,
allowed the installation of Porfirio ‘Pepe’ Lobo of the Nationalist Party as President
of Honduras on 27 January 2010. In order to understand this process, it is important
to trace the controversial presidency of Zelaya.
Manuel Zelaya (2005–2009) was the epitome of an oligarchic president,
coming from Honduras’ economic and political elite which like its neighbours is
dominated by a small number of families who also have key roles in the state.79
Nonetheless, in the latter two years of his term, Zelaya broke with history and
attempted to engage with popularly based social movements and NGOs. Examples
of actions in this direction were his holding of regular popular assemblies in the
presidential palace, and implementation of measures seen as hostile to business
elite interests such as raising the minimum wage by almost 40% in 2009.80 The
most contentious proposal, however, was to hold a referendum, at the same time
as the elections in November 2009, on the installation of a Constituent Assembly
to redraft the country’s constitution. This was a step too far for the Honduran elite
and, in their view, firmly allied Zelaya with Hugo Cha´vez, leading to Zelaya’s over-
throw on 28 June 2009.81
After the coup, the Honduran state retrenched firmly to its servile position
to the oligarchy, while ‘civil society’ became polarized into two main camps.
Unlike mainstream media coverage, which presented a simple pro- or anti-
Zelaya division in Honduras,82 we found through field research that in effect
there were pro- and anti-coup factions, with the latter divided into two main
groups: those who were originally supporters of the president and those who sup-
ported the return of the constitutional order, but did not necessarily support Zelaya.
The social base of these groups consists of among others indigenous, peasants,
feminists, progressive sections of the Catholic Church, labour unions, LGBT
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(lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) groups, with Zelaya supporters among
supporters and members of the Liberal Party. Those supporting the coup are
business groups, the media, the church hierarchy, including the country’s Cardinal
Rodriguez, the two main political parties, the Human Rights Ombudsman, the
Armed Forces, the police and, crucially, the main institutions of the state. Mass
media campaigns and marches, heavily protected by the army and police have
framed these groups under a careful rhetoric of national unity and claim to be
the true voice of ‘civil society’, calling themselves the ‘whites’, in an effort to sym-
bolize peace and purity.83 This stands in stark contrast with media portrayals of the
anti-coup groups who were dubbed as ‘mobs’ and ‘undesirables’. In more than a
rhetorical act, these groups have rejected the label ‘civil society’ in favour of
what they consider the more inclusive terminology of ‘National Popular Resistance
Movement’ (FNRP).84
Research informants emphasized that social divisions were not a consequence
of the coup but were made visible by it, both at the national and international level.
These fissures are further crossed by ideological views of democracy. Pro-coup
groups understand democracy as the existing institutional configuration that
benefits elite interests: order is prioritized over human rights as the massive repres-
sion of social movements since 2009 has attested.85 One business leader suggested
that this ‘peaceful’ handover of power was in fact a ‘great test for Honduran
democracy’ and not a coup at all.86 Anti-coup groups seek a more inclusive
form of democracy, with a more progressive conception of the state and a ‘new
social pact’, the central aim of the FNRP.87 Hence, Honduran civil society is frac-
tured between those who recognize the current Lobo administration and those who
reject it, who are active in the FNRP and demand a new social pact. At the heart of
this struggle is what constitutes ‘democracy’ and whose needs it serves.
Honduras also illustrates vividly the impact of globalization in contemporary
democratization struggles. Zelaya had taken Honduras into the Venezuelan-led
ALBA initiative in 2008 and many identified the coup as a ‘laboratory’ strategy
to defeat the advance of that initiative with its close alliance with social movements
in the region and its rejection of neoliberal conceptions of international
cooperation, such as free trade agreements. Many respondents alleged that conser-
vative elements within the US establishment, as well as sections of the Miami
Cuban and Venezuelan right, advised the coup plotters. The close involvement
of the United States in brokering agreements on the coup underlined Honduras’
political and economic dependence on that state. The failure to return Zelaya to
power, the lengthy period needed to return him permanently to Honduras and
the continuance in power of the Lobo administration, despite questions around
its democratic and hence international legitimacy, reinforce this reading’s
plausibility.88
In Honduras, hence, we find both state and civil society as terrains of struggle
between two contending forces, with differing social bases and holding distinct
views of what constitutes democracy and democratization, divisions equally
reflected at the international level, most notably in the Americas. Whether this
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conflict will eventually result in further democratization or de-democratization will
depend on the outcome of the struggle between the contending forces within Hon-
duras and the impact of the international context on that struggle. It remains to be
seen how Zelaya’s return to Honduras inMay 2011, as part of the Cartagena accord
brokered by President Santos of Colombia and President Cha´vez of Venezuela, will
influence these outcomes.
Nicaragua: civil society or ‘sociedad sı´ vil’?89
Daniel Ortega’s return to power in January 2007, for the first time since the FSLN’s
(Sandinista) defeat in elections in 1990, ended 16 years of conservative rule in
Nicaragua. While the Ortega government claims that it is aiming to restore the
social advances of the Sandinista revolution (1979–1990) dismantled since its
defeat, Ortega’s re-election as president has instead seen Nicaragua experience a
deepening polarization between the government and the social forces supporting
it on the one hand, and on the other, many prominent NGOs, much of them histori-
cally linked to Sandinismo, the media, particularly the print media, and opposition
parties. This polarization is cemented around the figure of Daniel Ortega as presi-
dent and his wife, Rosario Murillo.
This polarization is also philosophically and ideologically based on different
conceptions of democracy, with the nature and role of the state, that of civil
society and their inter-relation central to these differences. The government
insists that state power must be restored after the damage inflicted on it by neoli-
beralism, and central to this is the restoration of popular power and the re-balancing
of state/civil society relations. The Ortega-led government seeks to achieve this
restoration of popular power by two principal means – popular participation and
social programmes aimed at the poorest sectors of society. The main vehicle for
the FSLN government to establish popular participation is through the Citizen
Power Councils (CPCs), also known as Citizen Power Cabinets. CPCs are
neighbourhood-based committees with the officially stated objective of improving
local access to services. Civil society in this conception, therefore, is about people
engaging directly with the state. The second element in the restoration of popular
power, social programmes, are directly related to the first, in that CPCs also admin-
ister the flagship government projects, Zero Hunger – whereby local women
receive animals and seeds to allow them to farm on a small scale – and Zero
Profit, where local people can get access to microloans to start small enterprises.
CPCs, along with the local community, identify the people who would most
benefit from these government schemes, acting in effect as the liaison mechanism
between the neighbourhood and the state.
These actions are framed within a wider geopolitical strategy, whereby the
FSLN government seeks to achieve greater room for manoeuvre for such policy
experimentation through the establishment of alliances with new international
actors, while attempting to refrain from overly alienating other key actors with con-
siderable power over Nicaragua. Nicaragua has joined the Venezuelan-led
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Petrocaribe and ALBA initiatives, allowing it to avail itself of cheap oil at low
credit rates, as well as accessing considerable funding for development projects.
Equally, Nicaragua has formed a close relationship with Russia, leading to a
number of preferential deals. Nonetheless, it has maintained scrupulously circum-
spect relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ensuring prompt
payment of debt, a key issue for this heavily indebted nation, although the
Ortega government has managed to alienate key donors due to its disputes with
NGOs.
Field research carried out by the authors shows that CPCs have been met with
great scepticism, if not outright hostility, by traditional ‘civil society’, mostlyNGOs
which have been historically aligned with the FSLN. After the fall of the Sandinista
revolution, theNGO sector expanded enormously inNicaragua, supported by inter-
national cooperation funds aimed at strengthening ‘civil society’. The arrival of an
FSLN government caused splits within the NGO community, creating an insider
and outsider status in their relations with the state. Ortega and the First Lady,
Rosario Murillo, have attacked NGOs, with the latter calling them ‘sociedad sı´
vil’ – ‘vile society’ – a play on the Spanish for civil society – sociedad civil.
Links between NGOs and United States funders associated with political meddling
in Latin American politics (that is, USAid and the National Endowment for
Democracy [NED]) – not least in Nicaragua – have been questioned. Furthermore,
government officials interviewed question NGO claims to representativeness, due
to their unelected status, unlike government.90
While these critiques may be valid with regard to NGOs more generally, they
must be considered within the conflictual politics of Nicaragua. In 2008 the govern-
ment accused a number of national and international NGOs, including Oxfam GB,
of money laundering. Feminist organizations in particular were targeted. Fieldwork
shows that many NGO personnel, especially from women’s organizations, believe
that this is linked to their opposition to the criminalization of therapeutic abortion
and to their support for Ortega’s stepdaughter, Zoila´merica Narvaez, who accused
him of sexual abuse in the late 1990s.91 The accusations against these organizations
are thought to have emerged also due to these NGOs being seen as competitors with
the Frente, and hence the state, both for consciences and for resources.
These developments have had mixed reactions within the NGO sector, ranging
from vehement opposition to the government, rejection of its behaviour but with a
reluctance to enter into conflict, and amongst some sectors active cooperation. The
most notable reaction, however, has been the first, with many NGOs, supported by
the media, accusing the government of totalitarianism similar to that of the
Somozas, pointing to the CPCs in particular as a means to that end.92 This is
based on an evaluation of the CPCs as sectarian and exclusive in character, inhibit-
ing existing organizational models and acting as indoctrination mechanisms. They
are seen to reduce citizen autonomy of thought and action, occupy increasing
numbers of social spaces and act as gatekeepers for access to social goods.
The different interpretations of CPCs are emblematic of the polarized views on
the Sandinista government led by Daniel Ortega. The government argues that their
1054 B. Cannon and M. Hume
policies are instruments to challenge neoliberalism and replicate historic revolu-
tionary structures. Critics interviewed argue that the government is in fact neolib-
eral due to the business interests of Ortega and his continued cooperation with
international financial institutions, including capital. While the government sees
its policies as the beginnings of a new pact between society and the state, its
most ferocious critics see it as a totalitarian project aimed at perpetuating Ortega
and the FSLN in power. The government claims that polarization is media-
driven and mostly Managua-based but many fear that it is so acute that it has
caused irreparable damage to the political process.93 Poll evidence suggests that
polarization directly affects the Nicaraguan public’s trust in both government
and civil society. Thus, it is difficult to imagine in the current context how these
diametrically opposed visions can be reconciled, and trust in political elites, and
their civil society allies, strengthened.94
Conclusion: the ‘pink tide’ in Central America: democratization
or de-democratization?
As stated in the introduction, the principal aim of this study was to assess prospects
for democratization in Central America in the context of the shift to the left in the
region. In general, evidence supports the contention that in the three countries
studied there is potential for both increased democratization, but also dangers
for blocking of such potential and indeed the reversal of existing democratic
gains. Evidence found provides four supporting arguments for this position, argu-
ments which also provide support for a re-evaluation of transition theory as a useful
tool with which to analyse democratization processes.
First, clear evidence was found of advances and reversals in democratization in
each of the three countries. Each country presented cases of increased popular par-
ticipation in decision-making processes which went beyond mere electoralism. In
each, however, this was often unsuccessful, restricted, or carried within it potential
for democratic reversal with Honduras as the most notable example. The case
studies also indicate that democratization and de-democratization processes do
not take place in a linear fashion, but rather each case shows co-existing democra-
tizing and de-democratizing tendencies.
Second, research findings emphasize the continued centrality of structural
inequalities to democratization struggles in Central America. These, however,
should be analysed within the heritage of weak states, divided elites and foreign
interference, which can and does divert such struggles into polarizing, personalistic
politics with little democratizing potential. Here ‘civil society’ is circumstantially
defined since the power arrangements of each case include and exclude different
characterizations of civil society. This is key to understanding the ebbs and
flows of the political process. The partisan links of civil society in El Salvador
can open or close political space. In Honduras, social movements against the
coup reject the label of civil society, while the government disqualifies and
represses those grouped in the FNRP. The state engages only with an ‘official’
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civil society of organizations linked to church and business sectors. In Nicaragua
the contestation over the ‘civil society space’ is played out between the state-desig-
nated CPCs and those NGOs which are excluded by the state and reviled by the
presidential couple. All three cases point not only to the dialectical nature of
state/civil society relations in the face of the impact of capital and its effects of
poverty and inequality, but to the subordination of the public interest to the so-
called ‘freedoms’ of a narrow elite.
This brings up a third issue, related to the level and radicalness of reform and
the very meaning of democracy. All three cases, and Honduras in particular, point
to the limitations on democratizing measures by the threat of interference by local
and international economic actors, if essential oligarchic interests are jeopardized.
In other words, market interests circumscribe the actions of the state and weigh
heavily on the designation of different sectors as ‘civil society’, confirming the por-
ousness of boundaries between state, market and civil society. These findings
emphasize further the limits to the current left projects throughout Latin
America within the current context of an ideologically weakened but institutionally
persistent neoliberal governance.
Finally, the article highlights the usefulness of studying Central America in this
respect, since few areas in Latin America have been quite so exposed to the com-
bination of extreme oligarchic power and outside interference. This has heightened
ideological and economic polarization within these countries, with a determining
effect on their political processes. As this article shows, in the context of the
‘pink tide’ this can provide valuable data on how these processes can be affected
negatively by personalized politics and elite interests, the latter further strength-
ened by neoliberalism and globalization.
These findings further point to a need to re-evaluate the usefulness of transition
theory in democratization studies as indicated in the introductory sections. As we
stated, two main critiques have been levelled at that theory; that it is inherently
teleological – and ‘eurocentric’ – in its assumptions, and that its concentration
on elites and institutions lead to difficulties in explaining outcomes in democrati-
zation processes. Findings show that in each case an analysis of civil society/state
interaction on the national level, and within the wider context of globalization, can
provide deeper understanding of prospects for democratization.95 In each case we
found that the democratizing and de-democratizing tendencies encountered have
historical roots which need to be taken into account. This supports our contention
that democratization is not a unilinear process, much less one which will terminate
in ‘democracy’ as it is assumed to exist in the ‘West’, with its emphasis on insti-
tutions and electoralism. This demands an analysis of this struggle within the
wider limits of neoliberal governance, questioning the conventional liberal separ-
ation between state, civil society and market. Finally, we stated that while civil
society is a central concept to help understand democratization processes it
cannot be viewed as a fixed entity but one shaped by the contending social
forces of a particular historical conjuncture, a struggle in which the state has a
crucial determining role.
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The article therefore argues that the concept of democratization is crucial for
accurate analysis of political developments in Latin America and beyond, but it
underlines the need for a radical re-evaluation of transition theory and all its teleo-
logical implications. Accordingly, we agree with Whitehead96 that a wide-angled
historical and analytical lens is required, rather than the usual focus in transition
theory on a narrow timescale and sets of actors, but depart from the liberal per-
spective underlying his thesis. We argue instead – moving closer to a neo-Grams-
cian approach – that theory on democratization should centre analysis on
empirical phenomena arising from class-based, open-ended and simultaneous
struggle within the interlinked terrains of civil society, state and market. With
such a renewed perspective difficulties such as conceptual stretching and teleo-
logical assumptions can be avoided, allowing democratization theory to remain
an essential tool for future political analysis within the current uncertain global
context.
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